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SUMMARY
Canadians have heard a great deal of discussion in the national media about expanding the Canada Pension
Plan (CPP), driven by concerns that many will retire without having made proper arrangements to
adequately replace their incomes with pensions and savings. But the proposed remedies have been
targeted at the retirement-income shortfalls potentially faced by relatively comfortable middle-class and
well-off retirees. A far more pressing concern is the disproportionate vulnerability of one particular group:
Single retirees living alone.
The estimated poverty rate among seniors in Canada is among the lowest in the industrialized world
according to the OECD. But elderly singles living alone face significantly higher rates of income inadequacy
than their peers. Elderly singles are overwhelmingly female, and they are twice as likely to be below
Statistics Canada’s Low Income Cut-Off threshold than the general population, and four times as likely to
be below the threshold as the elderly population as a whole. 
But the CPP policy ideas currently being batted around are unlikely to offer much help to this especially
vulnerable group. Because females comprise roughly 70 per cent of elderly singles, and because of
historically lower labour-force participation rates among females, a substantial portion of single elderly are
entitled to few or no CPP benefits of their own (let alone other pensions), beyond the considerably reduced
survivor CPP benefits collected by those who have been widowed. Survivor benefits, however, would not
be available to the growing number of senior divorcees. Meanwhile, women tend to have longer life
expectancies than men do, typically stretching retirement resources beyond what would otherwise be
required for males.
There are two relatively straightforward policy changes that could directly target benefits to help the single
elderly living alone who are below the low income cut-off (LICO threshold). One is to modify the Guaranteed
Income Supplement (GIS) top up strictly for elderly people living alone. Another would be to simply expand
the CPP survivor benefit from 60 per cent of the deceased spouse’s entitlement to 100 per cent.
These policies are not without cost, of course. But the cost is not prohibitive. If the federal government were
to allot $1.35 billion to these kinds of targeted policies, it could slash the number of single seniors living
below the low income cut-off by half. With another $87 million, it could reduce the number by two-thirds.
These amount, respectively, to just a 3.5 per cent and 5.8 per cent increase over current annual federal
spending on elderly benefits. With Canadian policy-makers willing to spend resources and efforts on
strengthening CPP benefits for relatively comfortable Canadians, it seems only appropriate that policies
aimed at helping our most vulnerable seniors avoid poverty should come first.
† We would like to thank Ronald Kneebone, Herb Emery, Kevin Milligan, Henri-Paul Rousseau and an anonymous
reviewer for their comments, which greatly improved this paper.
Some of the analysis presented in this paper is based on Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation
Database Model. The assumptions and calculations underlying the simulation were prepared by the authors
and the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data rests entirely with them.
INTRODUCTION
Compared to most advanced industrialized countries, Canada has a relatively small number of
low-income seniors. For example, only 5.2 per cent of individuals 65 years of age and older
were below Statistics Canada’s Low Income Cut-Off (LICO) line in 2010. In turn, recent
discussions surrounding retirement-income adequacy in Canada, such as the CPP expansion
recently proposed by Prince Edward Island, have focused on policies related to replacement
income for middle-income families.1 For the most part, the numbers seem to indicate that, on
average, low-income seniors are well protected from income insecurity by government transfers
including Old Age Security (OAS), Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and Canada/Quebec
Pension Plan (CPP/QPP) benefits (as well as full health care coverage under medicare), as well
as a patchwork of provincial programs. This conclusion also came from research prepared for
the federal, provincial and territorial ministers of finance in 2009.2 Further, recent research has
shown that poverty is more prevalent below the age of 65, and therefore a more significant
issue.3
We believe, however, that aggregate statistics mask a deeper problem: the disproportionate
vulnerability of single elderly who live alone. This group is nearly 70 per cent female and, on
the whole, shows LICO incidence more than double that of the total population,4 and four times
the total elderly population. Among single elderly living alone, roughly one-fifth had incomes
under the low-income cutoff in 2012. When disaggregated, the data clearly show that elderly
persons living on their own face a disproportionate risk of poverty and replacement-income
inadequacy. We argue, based on our findings, that income-adequacy policies targeting the single-
elderly demographic should be given priority, and that the CPP adjustments that are currently
the focus of public discussions on income support for the elderly, would largely not benefit this
group.
Policies should be directed at these most vulnerable single seniors, such as enhancements to the
GIS top-up program targeted at those seniors with the lowest incomes, and increased survivor-
benefit rates under the Canada Pension Plan.
1 The Prince Edward Island proposal increases the replacement incomes above $25,000, a proposal based on: Michael
C. Wolfson, “Projecting the Adequacy of Canadians’ Retirement Incomes: Current Prospects and Possible Reform
Options,” IRPP Study 17 (2011); and Michael C. Wolfson, “Not-so-modest Options for Expanding the CPP/QPP,”
IRPP Study 41 (2013).
2 Jack M. Mintz, Summary Report on Retirement Income Adequacy Research (Ottawa: Finance Canada, December
2009).
3 J. C. Herbert Emery, Valerie C. Fleisch and Lynn McIntyre, “How a Guaranteed Annual Income can Put Food Banks
Out of Business,” School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, SPP Research Papers 6, 37 (December 2013).
4 Here the 2012 LICO incidence for single elderly living alone (20 per cent, derived from our analysis using Statistics
Canada Social Policy Simulation Database Model) is compared with the 2011 LICO incidence for the total population
(8.8 per cent, taken from Statistics Canada table 202-0802).
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MEASURING POVERTY
In Canada, there is no functioning definition of poverty that has been formally endorsed by the
government of Canada. Statistics Canada does however regularly make use of three low-
income measures: LICO, the Market Basket Measure (MBM), and the Low Income Measure
(LIM). For analysis of income in this paper, we will use the LICO (Low Income Cut-Off)
threshold as a low-income indicator and present our findings relative to this measure. The
LICO consistently produces the most conservative low-income threshold across regions5 in the
year of analysis, and this informs our findings regarding the incidence of low-income elderly in
Canada. We acknowledge that these findings are sensitive to the income measure used.
While the seniors below the LICO threshold have declined sharply since the mid-1970s,6
Canada has witnessed a recent increase from 4.8 to 5.2 per cent between 2007 and 2010.7
The MBM and the LIM are also regularly employed in policy analysis in Canada and are
preferred by some policy analysts and social scientists. Using the MBM as the threshold for
low income over the period 2007–2011, the number of low-income elderly (65 and older)
nearly doubled between 2007 and 2011, jumping from 3.0 to 5.7 per cent.8 Using the LIM
measure over the same period, Canada witnessed an increase from 5.0 to 7.2 per cent of elderly
below the low-income threshold. LIM comparisons among elderly in different countries have
regularly been undertaken by the OECD. The most recent shows that eight among the 34
OECD nations have a lower incidence of LIM seniors than does Canada.9 These include Czech
Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Slovak Republic. 
There is little consensus among policy analysts as to which measure should be the preferred
standard for evaluating income adequacy. Each measure has strengths and weaknesses and
appeals to different individuals based on their beliefs about the dynamics and characteristics
that define poverty and income adequacy.10 The three measures (LICO, MBM, and LIM) can
be seen as competing standards, but can also be regarded as complementary indicators of
income adequacy based on differing criteria.
5 When compared with the MBM or LIM measure across MBM regions. Authors’ calculations adjust MBM and LIM
for 2011 to 2012 at an inflation rate of three per cent. Comparison based on: Statistics Canada, Table: “Low income
cut-offs (1992 base) after tax”; Statistics Canada, Table: “Market Basket Measure thresholds (2011-base)”; and
Statistics Canada, Table: “Low income measures by income concept” (Statistics Canada Publication, Catalogue
75F0002M). 
6 In 1977, the number of elderly below the LICO threshold was 30.4 per cent. Statistics Canada, Table 202-0802:
“Persons in low-income families.”
7 ibid.
8 Statistics Canada, Table 202-0802 “Persons in low-income families.”
9 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Pensions at a Glance 2013 (Paris: OECD Publishing,
2013), 165. 
10 Though the three measures may differ in the short run, Statistics Canada’s Income Research Paper Series (catalogue
no. 75F0002MWE) notes of the LICO, MBM, and LIM measures: “Overall, low income incidences under different
lines appeared to track each other well and they all tracked business cycles.” The study concludes that each can be
useful as an indicator of low income, though they vary in sensitivity and inclusion. 
2
3The LICO threshold indicates the level of income at which a family will likely spend 20 per
cent more of its household income than will the average family on basic necessities (based on
household consumption data from 1992 adjusted for inflation thereafter). The measure accounts
for both family size and community size (i.e., rural versus metropolitan). Averaged across
community size, the low-income cutoff for a single individual living alone in 2012 was
$16,005. When compared with the LIM, which establishes a low-income threshold at one-half
of median income, the rate of single elderly living alone who are below the low-income
threshold is substantially higher, at 39.8 per cent, based on a low-income threshold of $20,016
in 2012. A third measure, the MBM, establishes a low-income threshold based on a minimum
level of income necessary to attain a standardized basket (designed for a family of two parents
25–49 and two children) of base necessities adjusting for family size and regional differences
in pricing. When averaged across regions, the MBM for a single individual in Canada was
$17,537 in 2011; adjusted for inflation at three per cent, this would represent $18,063 in
2012.11
We further note that income needed to ensure a minimal level of consumption to avoid poverty
during retired years may be less than during working years.12 In part, those who work must
spend money on clothing and transportation that is not incurred during retirement years. Also,
consumer durables — such as housing purchased during working years — provide for needs
during retired years. On the other hand, additional private expenditures related to health are
typically higher in retired years, potentially offsetting any saving in consumption, especially at
low-income levels.13 Given the use of LICO as the more conservative low-income indicator,
our analysis incorporates a certain downward bias in estimating income adequacy.
Income data for households do not include the imputed return on housing and any accrued
income from the ownership of financial assets. While the latter should not be consequential for
low-income senior households, the ownership of a house, instead of renting, would reduce any
estimated poverty rate. One recent study suggests that the inclusion of home ownership would
reduce poverty rates by roughly two percentage points.14
We would also like to note that in addition to the considerations presented above there are an
additional set of considerations regarding the treatment of data. In the box below titled “Data
Treatment,” we provide an overview of these considerations, and resulting limitations on the
analysis undertaken for this paper. Due to these considerations, LICO analysis of income
adequacy was limited to roughly 80 per cent of elderly households. 
11 Given regional differences, low-income measures here are averaged for illustrative simplicity. However this is not the
case for the underlying analysis undertaken for the paper. 
12 See: Jack M. Mintz, Summary Report on Retirement Income Adequacy Research (Ottawa: Finance Canada,
December 2009).
13 See recent analysis by B. J. MacDonald, D. Andrews and R.L. Brown, “The Cost of Basic Needs for the Canadian
Elderly,” Canadian Journal On Aging 29, 1 (2010): 39-56.
14 Sam Norris and Krish Pendakur, “Imputing Rent in Consumption Measures with an Application to Consumer
Poverty in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Economics 46, 4 (2013): 1537-1570.
DATA TREATMENT
Population Under Analysis and Limitations 
When analyzing the data on elderly individuals, we had to make some decisions as to how
we would treat elderly households in which the composition of the household was
ambiguous. Ambiguity in household composition poses a serious challenge in assessing the
circumstances of individuals within a household. When relationships within the household
are ambiguous, it is difficult to assess how the total household income, composed of varying
individual incomes, will be used toward the welfare of different individuals in the house. In
these cases, the distribution of goods and services is partly purchased with total household
income, and thus individual circumstance cannot be reasonably inferred. 
In unambiguous households, the nature of relationships within the household allows for
reasonable inference as to how overall household income will be employed toward the
welfare of individuals in the home. Put simply, we can reasonably expect that a couple will
enjoy the goods and services purchased with household income fairly equally, regardless of
the distribution of individual incomes. We can also say with confidence that the welfare of
an individual living alone will be clearly defined by their individual (and, in this case,
household) income. However, in a household composed of cohabitating individuals who are
not related by such clearly defined familial relationships, it is difficult to assess how the
household income will be used toward the welfare of different individuals in the house. For
instance, if the hypothetical couple referenced above were joined in the house by a sister,
cousin, friend, renter or any other number of “adults” — as they would be indicated in
Statistics Canada data — there would not be any clear or predictable financial implications
as to how household income would be distributed toward the welfare of different individuals.
Even in cases where familial relationships exist but do not offer predictable financial
implications, this ambiguity remains. This is true of elderly who are living in households with
ambiguous composition. For instance, a single elderly person living with his or her children
may be filing his or her taxes as an individual, or may be listed as a dependent on a child’s
tax form. In the case where an elder files as an individual, his or her individual income may
be very low, yet the circumstances in the household could allow for a very high quality of life
based on the support of other earners in the household. In contrast, a low-income elderly
person may be living with other individuals who have higher incomes, resulting overall in a
mid-range household income. However, there may be no redistribution of income within the
household and the elderly person’s circumstance may be reflected entirely by their individual
income. This is problematic for analysis of income adequacy using a standard such as LICO
or MBM that evaluates income adequacy based on household income, though the same
problem would exist if individual income were used. Such income measures are ultimately
proxies for individual welfare, and when household composition does not allow for reasonable
inference regarding the relationship between individual incomes, household income, and the
welfare of individuals in the house, analysis of income adequacy may lead to false
conclusions, whether it is based in individual income or household income.
Given this complication in interpreting the data, we have limited the LICO analysis to those
cases where we feel that household composition is entirely unambiguous, and allows for
reasonable expectations as to how household income will contribute to individual welfare.
As such, our LICO analysis is limited to the roughly 80 per cent of elderly households
composed of a married couple living alone, or an individual living alone. This means that
elderly living in care facilities and under the care of relatives are excluded, along with those
caring for children or merely cohabitating with them, elderly caring for a grandchild, and
elderly cohabitating with other adults who are not legal spouses. As discussed above, we
feel the use of LICO to evaluate these households would be problematic. We have opted to
include this group in the simple distribution of elderly by household income, treating them as
a single group, which we have labeled “other” (Figure 1B). However, we feel that the
ambiguity surrounding the circumstances of elderly in these households likely undermines
the immediate implications that might be drawn from these data.
We should also note that in all of our calculations, both income and income measures reflect
after-tax income (money transfers from government are added to income). 
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CURRENT ISSUES AND INCOME ADEQUACY AMONG SENIORS
Roughly 11.7 per cent15 of all elderly individuals, including those who may have never married
or have lost a spouse through death, live in households with incomes below $20,000. Senior
households16 with incomes below $20,000 are largely represented by single individuals living
alone rather than married couples.17 This is to be expected as single households have only one
income. If we compare the percentage of single-elderly households with incomes below
$20,000 (32.6 per cent of single-elderly households) to the percentage of elderly households
containing a married couple with incomes below $40,000 (29.0 per cent of elderly-couple
households), we might conclude that there is a similar incidence of low-income elderly
households between the two groups (Figure 1B).18 However, when the income adequacy of
these two groups is evaluated using LICO, we find a significantly higher incidence of elderly
singles with income under $20,000 below the LICO threshold (52.6 per cent) when compared
with the LICO incidence of elderly households containing a married couple below $40,000
(15.7 per cent for households containing a couple with one elderly, and 6.3 per cent for
households containing a couple with two elderly).19 This is because income adequacy measures
such as LICO and MBM adjust to reflect the economies of scale that result from shared living
costs. As individuals who live together may share the cost of housing, transport, appliances,
and services, those who cohabit can individually attain an equivalent level of goods and
services consumed by an individual living alone, but at a lower overall cost. The LICO
analysis presented later in the paper suggests that an elderly couple — really any couple, for
that matter — with an income between $20,000 and $40,000, is less likely to face the same
circumstances as a single individual living alone. This further suggests — as discussed above
— that individual income is only a meaningful indicator of circumstance in the context of
household composition. 
As indicated by Figures 1B and 1C, the combination of OAS, GIS, and CPP/QPP (along with a
patchwork of provincial top-up programs that are less consequential) for a married senior
couple results in very few couples having incomes below $20,000.20 In contrast, a large number
of singles are left with income below $20,000 (Figures 2A and 2B). It is also clear that single
seniors are most reliant on GIS and OAS and, on average, receive few CPP benefits either from 
15 In this instance, all households containing one or more elderly person have been included.
16 A senior household for the purpose of this paper is a household in which the head of the household, his or her
spouse, or both, are age 65 years or older. The households considered in this paper are limited to households that do
not contain any dependents, such as children or grandchildren. 
17 In our data, we identify single households as those individuals who do not live with anyone else. This is different
than Statistics Canada’s use of “unattached individuals” that include single-elderly living with others but are not
married. The higher incidence of low-income single households compared to married senior households was also
noted by R. Finnie, D. Gray and Y. Zhang, “The Receipt of Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) Status among
Canadian Seniors — An Analysis of the Incidence,” Canadian Public Policy 39, Supplement (2013): S65-S79. Other
characteristics describing elderly poverty are discussed by T. Schirle, “Senior Poverty in Canada: A Decomposition
Analysis,” Canadian Public Policy 39, 4 (2013): 517-40.
18 Authors’ calculations based on the SPSDM database. The SPSDM data is composed of Statistics Canada Census
data, data from Statistics Canada Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, Statistics Canada Survey of Household
Spending, and Canada Revenue Agency T1 tax data.
19 Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada Social Policy Simulation/Database Model.
20 So few that there is insufficient data to produce a reliable estimation of the composition of household income for the
couples in this group, and this is reflected below in Figure 2A.
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their own working years or as a spousal benefit (the data cannot separate the two types). Thus,
as we discuss further below, CPP expansion is not a policy that will contribute to greater
income-adequacy for low-income seniors. 
In looking at the data, we also recognized a continuing demographic trend among seniors with
household incomes below $20,000. As Figure 1C illustrates, there is a disproportionate
incidence of women in low-income categories. This figure, when considered in relation to the
total distribution of income among senior households in Figure 1B, indicates that the large
majority of households with incomes below $20,000 contain elderly single females. There are a
few inter-related demographic trends that have contributed to this dynamic. For instance,
women typically have a longer life expectancy than male partners,21 and may find themselves
below the LICO threshold in the absence of a partner’s income contribution. The same is true
of divorce, which has seen a recent increase among couples 65 and over (Figure 1A). Given a
historically lower labour-force participation rate among females — which translate to lower
rates of CPP entitlement, and thus retirement income among elderly women — any factors that
contribute to an increased number of single elderly women living on their own will
undoubtedly contribute to a disproportionate number of elderly women with low incomes. 
FIGURE 1A: DIVORCE AMONG 65+ ON THE RISE
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Population, 2006 and 2011.
We note that the workforce-participation gap has been steadily closing since the mid-1970s,
with female workforce participation growing from 41.3 to 61.8 per cent between 1976 and
2013,22 and this will certainly translate to higher levels of income adequacy among future
cohorts of aging women. However, over the same period, male labour-force participation rates
have seen an equally steady decline of roughly nine per cent, from 81 to 72.5 per cent. Given 
21 Statistics Canada, Summary Tables, “Life expectancy at birth, by sex, by province, 2014.”
22 Statistic Canada, Table: 282-0002, “Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by sex and detailed age group, 2014.”
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that the male component of the workforce is still more than 10 per cent larger23 and earns a
wage roughly 50 per cent24 higher on average, it is not immediately clear what the overall trend
in elderly income adequacy will be if the decline in male labour-force participation continues.
Overall combined labour-force participation rates continue to increase with nearly twice the
number of women entering as there are males exiting over the past 40 years. We suspect this
will ultimately translate to increased CPP-entitlement among future cohorts and a net increase
in income adequacy among the elderly. Given the dramatic increase in labour-force
participation among women, we would also expect a more equal distribution of income
adequacy among men and women. However, changing demographic factors such as more
childless couples and increased divorce rates could offset some of these trends.
FIGURE 1B: DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY INDIVIDUALS BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE AND INCOME
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada Social Policy Simulation/Database Model.
Notes: Please see the box titled “Data Treatment” for a description of the category “other,” and a note on the 
treatment of data.
23 ibid.
24 2011 data, defined over female income. Statistics Canada, Summary Tables, “Average earnings by sex and work
pattern, 2014.”
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FIGURE 1C: DISTRIBUTION OF ELDERLY INDIVIDUALS BY INCOME25
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada Social Policy Simulation/Database Model.
FIGURE 2A: HOUSEHOLDS CONTAINING A MARRIED COUPLE, BOTH ELDERLY (65+): INCOME SOURCES
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada Social Policy Simulation/Database Model.
Notes: 
1) Values shown for “other income” on the graph are accompanied by an arrow to indicate that the bar extends
beyond the visible portion of the graph, while the dollar value inside the bar is the total value of “other income.” 
2) The household income definition used for income brackets (X-axis) is total income before tax, including dissaving and
transfers. Composition of after-tax household income (Y-axis) is disposable income after tax, including dissaving and
transfers. Therefore after-tax disposable income may be lower than the before-tax household income bracket minimum.
3) Values are per capita over household income bracket.
4) All provincial elderly income support programs are included in GIS. On average, the value of these programs is
roughly $2,221 for a couple, based on a weighted average of Alberta, Ontario, B.C., Saskatchewan and New
Brunswick in 2013. However, for the analysis above, per capita averages were taken after individual incomes were
calculated based on actual provincial support received.
*5) The income category “Min-20k” ($20,000 and under) is subject to a low, unweighted sample size. The precise number
of households in this category and average composition of household income in this category is therefore not
statistically reliable. We suspect that the low average value of OAS for couples in this category is due to an
unweighted sampling composed of couples where one or both individuals are ineligible for the OAS program based on
residency requirements. As such, the income values in this one category are subject to artifact and are not reliable. 
25 In this instance, all elderly persons from all household types have been included.
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FIGURE 2B: HOUSEHOLDS CONTAINING A SINGLE ELDERLY PERSON (65+): INCOME SOURCES
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada Social Policy Simulation/Database Model.
Notes: 
1) Values shown for “other income” on the graph are accompanied by an arrow to indicate that the bar extends
beyond the visible portion of the graph, while the dollar value inside the bar is the total value of ”other income.” 
2) Household income definition used for income brackets (X-axis) is total income before tax, including dissaving and
transfers. Composition of after-tax household income (Y-axis) is disposable income after tax including dissaving and
transfers.
3) Values are per capita over household income bracket.
4) All provincial elderly income support programs are included in GIS. On average, the value of these programs is
roughly $1,264 for a single individual, based on a weighted average of Alberta, Ontario, B.C., Saskatchewan and
New Brunswick in 2013. However, for the analysis above, per capita averages were taken after individual incomes
were calculated based on actual provincial support received.
The most pressing issue with regards to addressing income security among seniors will be
ensuring that those elderly individuals living in single households who are disproportionately at
risk of poverty have the means to allow for a decent quality of life. Although, given the lack of
a hard definition, it is impossible for us to say which individuals with incomes below the LICO
threshold will be individuals who face “poverty,” it is certainly true that individuals whose
access to basic necessities is restricted by a lack of financial resources will be concentrated in
the LICO group.
As shown in Table 1 below, the highest concentration of low-income elderly is found in single
households. Using Statistics Canada’s after-tax LICO threshold, 20 per cent of elderly living
alone are low income, or in “straitened circumstances.”26
26 Statistics Canada literature on the LICO as a measure of income adequacy describes the LICO threshold as an
indicator of “straitened circumstances,” a term that implies restriction, distress, or deficiency. (Statistics Canada
website, “Low Income Cut-offs,” http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75f0002m/2009002/s2-eng.htm).
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TABLE 1: LOW-INCOME INCIDENCE BY TYPE OF SENIOR HOUSEHOLD
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada Social Policy Simulation/Database Model.
Notes: Average LICO thresholds presented are for illustration. In the calculations for this paper, household incomes 
were compared with the appropriate corresponding LICO threshold for analysis, and not the average. The average
LICO threshold presented is averaged across rural and metropolitan values. Elderly living in “other” households 
(20.6 per cent) are excluded in this analysis; see Box A for a note on data treatment.
Using the LICO as a measure of income adequacy, we would expect the incidence of low-
income elderly to be higher in metropolitan areas (cities with more than 500,000 residents).
This is largely a result of the fact that LICO thresholds are adjusted to reflect the higher cost of
living in metropolitan areas, while neither OAS nor GIS payments are adjusted to account for
this fact. As a result, seniors who reside in metropolitan areas and are dependent on OAS and
GIS may have significantly less purchasing power than those who reside in rural areas. As
shown in Table 2, federal OAS and GIS maximum payments, including an average provincial
top up, are only 92 per cent of the LICO threshold in metropolitan areas for singles. For
couples and for those singles living in rural areas, the combination of OAS and GIS represents
114 and 152 per cent of the LICO threshold, respectively. Though we would not go so far as to
recommend a policy that would vary income support for elders to account for regional
differences in cost of living, it should be noted that the current system creates an incentive for
migration from high-cost metropolitan areas to low-cost rural areas among elderly dependent
on OAS and GIS income support.
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Proportion Below
After-Tax Low
Income Cut-Off
(2012 LICO) 
Average After-Tax
Low Income 
Cut-Off 
(2012 LICO)
Proportion of
Total Elderly
Population
Household Type
Households Containing a 
Married Couple, One Elderly (65+) 7.8% $19,479.8 4.2%
Households Containing a 
Married Couple, Both Elderly (65+) 38.1% $19,479.8 1.9%
Households Containing a 
Single Elderly Person (65+) 33.5% $16,005.2 20.0%
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TABLE 2: INCOME SUPPORT, MAXIMUM ENTITLEMENT VS. LICO
Source: Statistics Canada, Low Income Cut-Offs, Catalogue 75F0002M; Service Canada, “Old Age Security pension 
and benefits — Monthly payment amounts and maximum annual income”; Government of Newfoundland Labrador, 
“Low Income Seniors' Benefit”; Alberta Ministry of Health, “SFA Information Booklet”; Government of Ontario, 
“Ontario Guaranteed Annual Income System”; Government of British Columbia, “Senior's Supplement”; 
Government of Saskatchewan Social Services, “Seniors Income Plan.”
Notes: Provincial elderly income support is calculated as a weighted average based on the number of seniors from each
of the included provinces. Provincial support programs were only included if explicitly designated as income 
support for seniors (i.e., rent support in Manitoba, etc., was not included). Alberta, Ontario, B.C., Saskatchewan 
and New Brunswick were included in deriving the weighted average. Values for 2013 were taken for provincial-
support programs and adjusted to 2012 dollars using an inflation rate of three per cent.
RECOMMENDED POLICY ACTIONS
Based on the analysis in the previous sections, we argue that current policy should focus on
single households. Two possible policy shifts can be considered: topping up GIS for single-
elderly households, and an expansion in CPP/QPP survivor benefits. 
Guaranteed Income Supplement Top Up
The most targeted and simplest method to reduce the number of seniors living below the LICO
threshold is to modify GIS payments. This can be achieved at a relatively low cost by simply
increasing the GIS top up for single-elderly households. We note, however, that a higher GIS
payment would also increase the income range that would be subject to the clawback of 50 per
cent currently applied to GIS payments. Such clawbacks have the unfortunate impact of raising
marginal tax rates on income, thereby discouraging savings to build retirement assets in some
cases. Further, a top up for singles only might encourage more singles to live on their own
rather than seek alternative arrangements such as living with relatives.
In Table 3, we note that some 348,000 single elderly in 2012 had incomes below the LICO
threshold. This is out of some 561,000 elderly singles having less than $20,000 in income, and
roughly 793,000 singles with incomes ranging from $20,000 to $40,000. 
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Single Elder Living Alone $6,539.8 $8,867.5 $1,264.7 $16,672.0 $14,618.7 $18,085.0 1.140 0.922
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We examine three policies that would reduce the number of single households living below the
LICO threshold: a reduction in the clawback rate on GIS from 50 to 25 per cent; an increase in
the basic GIS payout for single seniors from $8199.02 to $11,000; and an increase in the GIS
top up from $612 to $3,000. While GIS is intended to provide income to all low-income seniors
in need of some support, the GIS top up is an additional payment to those most vulnerable
seniors who have little or no income aside from OAS and GIS. Seniors are currently eligible for
the full value of the top up if they have less than $2,000 of additional income for an individual,
and $4,000 for a couple. Above the threshold, the top up is clawed back at a 26 per cent rate.
TABLE 3: POLICY OPTIONS TARGETED AT SINGLE ELDERLY LIVING ALONE
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics Canada Social Policy Simulation/Database Model.
For example, a policy to address the incidence of low income among single elderly is to increase
the GIS top up for single-households to $3,000 — at a total cost of $1.35 billion. This would
lower the number of seniors below the LICO threshold by nearly 165,000, reducing the number
of elderly Canadians currently below LICO by nearly half. A top up of $4,000 would further
reduce this number by almost two-thirds to 123,000 households, at a program cost of $2.2 billion.
We note that provinces also provide income support for seniors as well, though the level of
support is much smaller than with federal programs. In provinces where these programs are
structured as income guarantees — such as B.C. and Ontario, which supplement the difference
between income received and a guaranteed minimum income threshold — this means that
additional income support provided by the federal government could see offsetting reductions
in provincially provided income supplements, depending on the treatment of GIS income by
provincial programs. As in other cases before, a federal change in policy would require co-
ordination with provinces to ensure the intended outcome is achieved. This has been
successfully undertaken in earlier years with the revamping of the federal child-tax-benefit
program and working-income supplement. GIS enhancements would likely require such co-
ordination with provincial governments in provinces where senior income-supplement
programs are structured as income guarantees.27
27 The federal government is increasing the age of eligibility for OAS and GIS from 65 to 67 years of age beginning, and
phased in, after 2023. While it goes beyond this paper to address this issue, we are grateful to the point made by Kevin
Milligan that many single-elderly households tend to be age 75 or older, which cannot be segregated in our data.
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GIS Program Change
(Current Value in
Parenthesis)
Program
Cost
($Millions)
Current Values _ _ 348.0 561.2 792.8 1,354.0 
Basic GIS Clawback Rate 
Lowered to 25% (Currently 50%) $2,802 125.3 222.7 348.1 1,000.8 1,348.9 
GIS Basic Payout Value Increased 
to $11,000 (Currently $8,199.02) $2,841 216.0 131.9 203.9 1,148.9 1,352.8 
Single GIS Top-up Payout Increased 
to $3,000 (Currently $612.01) $1,345 165.0 182.9 297.9 1,056.2 1,354.0 
Single GIS Top-up Payout Increased 
to $4,000 (Currently $612.01) $2,223 225.1 122.9 97.9 1,254.9 1,352.8 
Reduction
in # of
Elderly
Below
LICO
# of
Elderly
Below
LICO
# of
Elderly
20k
Under
bracket 
# of
Elderly
20k-40k
bracket 
Total 
# of 
Elderly
Under 40k
bracket 
Numbers in Thousands
Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Survivor Rates
Another policy worth considering as a means to improve income security, especially for seniors
with modest incomes, is expanding the Canada Pension Plan survivor benefit from 60 to 100
per cent for a spouse whose husband or wife passes away. This policy would ensure that single
seniors are better protected from income shortfalls when a spouse passes away — such as the
loss of an OAS monthly payment, and the lost two-fifths of CPP payments previously collected
by the deceased spouse. While GIS helps buffer losses for the lowest-income single seniors,
many seniors with somewhat higher incomes would benefit from an expansion in survivor
benefits to ensure sufficient replacement income after a spouse passes away. 
In 2012–13, about 1.06 million seniors received survivor benefits.28 If survivor benefits were
increased from 60 per cent to 100 per cent, the additional cost in 2012–13 would have been
roughly $2.8 billion, representing a 0.78 per cent increase in the employee and employer rate
(shared half and half).
If the increase in CPP spousal benefits from 60 to 100 per cent is “fully funded,” existing
surviving spouses would not receive additional benefits. Instead, the benefits would be phased
in at a later time, funded by increased CPP contributions by the existing working population.
The implications of this proposal on income adequacy would need further analysis since we are
not able to separate singles receiving spousal benefits in the data we have used.
CONCLUSIONS
The data make clear that poverty among the elderly is largely concentrated in a particular
demographic: senior citizens living alone. This group is largely composed of women —
roughly 70 per cent are female — many of whom may have no entitlement to CPP, having
concentrated their work efforts in the home. 
Given that a substantial portion of individuals in this group have no claim to a CPP entitlement
— and with their working years behind them — the proposed expansions to CPP that are
currently at the forefront of our national discussion regarding retirement-income adequacy
would not address the current needs of our most vulnerable seniors. Nor would these proposed
expansions better the circumstances for equivalent future cohorts who do not accumulate
pension entitlements. 
As discussed, a number of simultaneous demographic shifts, including workforce participation
rates, wage rates, divorce rates and changing preferences in family structure will all contribute
to changes in the incidence of income adequacy/inadequacy in future cohorts. At present, there
is an identifiable need for a policy targeted at the single-elderly population. To the degree that
the demographic characteristics that have contributed to the disproportionate incidence of
income inadequacy among single-elderly are changing, the need and rationale for these policies
may also change.
28 See: Service Canada, 2013 CPP and OAS Statistics Tables, Ottawa,
http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/services/pensions/statistics/statbook/2013.shtml. 
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We have found that, at present, the most effective and targeted policy lever to address the
needs of low-income and impoverished seniors would be adjustments to the federal GIS
program; more specifically, an increase in the value of the GIS top up. Such an increase would
expand income support for those and only those most in need, minimizing the total program
cost and effectively targeting benefits to where they will do the most good.
Our calculations show that a $1.35-billion commitment on the part of the federal government
would halve the number of single seniors in Canada below the LICO threshold, where poverty
among seniors is most certain to be concentrated. With an expenditure of $2.22 billion, this
would be further reduced to one-third. To put these numbers in perspective, the 2013 federal
budget showed total program expenditures of $244 billion in 2011–2012, with $38 billion in
total expenditures for elderly benefits.29 This means that a 50 per cent reduction in poverty
among single seniors would represent only a 3.5 per cent increase in total elderly-benefit
spending, while a two-thirds reduction could be had for an increase of 5.8 per cent over current
expenditures. In the context of total federal program spending, this would represent roughly a
0.5 per cent and one per cent increase, respectively. Putting such a policy in place, one that
advances the security and dignity of the most vulnerable seniors, comes with a very reasonable
price tag. Amidst the current discussion focused on the adequacy of pensions for middle-class
and well-off seniors, it is hard to see why a policy that ensures the welfare of our lowest-
income seniors does not take some precedence.
29 Government of Canada, Budget 2013, Table 4.2.6 Program Expenses Outlook.
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